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I. Introduction
In 1971, independent filmmakers produced the award-winning
film, In Our Own Backyards, that explored health hazards caused by
uranium mining and milling operations.' When the filmmakers
sought to export the film to Canada and Australia, where the ura-
nium industry has become a topic of public debate, they applied to
the United States Information Agency (USIA) for certification of the
film's educational character. 2 This certificate would have made the
film eligible, under an international agreement, for exemption from
import duties and licensing requirements in other countries. 3 The
USIA consulted with the Department of Energy which recommended
that certification be denied because the film was "emotional rather
than technical." ' 4 The USIA denied certification on the grounds that
the purpose of the film was to present a certain point of view. 5
Arguing that the government had suppressed the film because it
contained information "the Energy Department would rather the
public not have," 6 the producers accused the USIA of "political cen-
sorship. ' ' 7 They joined other filmmakers in a lawsuit against the
I Rosenberg, For Our Eyes Only, AMERICAN FILM, July-Aug. 1988, at 40.
2 Id.
3 Id. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
4 Id.
5 Id. A similar situation occurred with the 1979 ABC News-produced documentary,
The Killing Ground, that investigated the problems of toxic waste disposal in the United
States. Id. at 40-41. The film was a watershed for public awareness of the hazards of toxic
wastes, and won "a dozen honors, including two Emmys, First Prize at the Monte Carlo
Film Festival, the Sidney Hillman Prize for Courage in Journalism from Columbia Univer-
sity, and an Academy Award nomination." Id. ABC sought to export The Killing Ground to
other countries and applied for Beirut Agreement certification from the USIA. The USIA
consulted with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which recommended that the
film not be certified. The EPA suggested that the ABC film was out of date since the
government had "made great progress in managing hazardous wastes." Id. ABC News
took the position that the government had suppressed the film because it embarrassed the
EPA. Id. EPA director Anne Burford was later forced to resign "amid charges that federal
officials allowed chemical companies to selectively edit government reports." Id.
(i Id. Susanna Styron, coproducer of the film, said further that the government has
"a vested interest in protecting uranium mining operations for nuclear-power and nuclear-
weapons productions programs." Id.
7 Id.
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USIA, challenging the regulations by which that agency had denied
certification to In Our Own Backyard and several other films.,
This Note examines the opinion of Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick 9 in
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held
the USIA regulations unconstitutional as vague and violative of the
first amendment right to freedom of speech.' 0 This Note also exam-
ines the new regulations promulgated by the USIA in response to
Bullfrog's mandate as well as alternatives to the present certification
process.
II. Statement of the Case
The Beirut Agreement'' is a multinational treaty designed to
foster international and cross-cultural understanding by facilitating
the "free flow of ideas by word and image" between the peoples of
member nations. '2 This purpose is to be achieved by exempting au-
dio-visual materials of an educational, scientific, or cultural nature
from customs duties, licensing restrictions, and other limitations 13
aimed at highly profitable commercial feature films. 14 The United
States ratified the Beirut Agreement in 1966, and Congress imple-
mented it by authorizing the President to designate an agency to
carry out necessary duties under the treaty. 15 The USIA now per-
forms that function."! To qualify for exemption under the treaty,
films or other materials must be certified as being of an educational,
scientific, or cultural character by the government of the country
where they were created.' 7 The certificate is presented upon entry
of the materials into another signatory state' 8 which then decides for
itself "whether the material is entitled to the privilege provided by"
the treaty.' 9 In actual practice, "USIA certificates are accepted by
8 See Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F.Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd 847 F.2d
502 (9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Bullfrog I].
') Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Bullfrog 11].
10 Id. at 514.
II Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory
Materials of an Educational, Scientific, or Cultural Character, opened for signatureJuly 15,
1949, 17 U.S.T. 1580, T.I.A.S. No. 6116, 197 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter the Agreement].
12 Id., preamble.
13 Id., art. 111, para. I. Such materials include film, filmstrips, sound recordings,
slides, models, maps and posters. Id., art. II.
14 Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 40-41. "Tariffs can be imposed based on the assessed
value of the raw film itself, or on the developing costs, or they can even equal the produc-
tion budget. Experts say duties as high as $50,000 per print have been levied." Id.
I5 Pub. L. No. 89-634, 80 Stat. 879 (1966). Ratification was held up in Congress for
some fifteen years after the statute's inception. The legislative history of this statute is
explained in 22 C.F.R. § 502.1(a) (1988).
1" 22 C.F.R. § 502.1(a) (1988).
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importing states as a matter of course." '20
The USIA certifies thousands of films for exportation under the
treaty each year. 2 1 Although the USIA or its predecessor organiza-
tions have been certifying films and other materials by essentially the
same rules for two decades, 22 in recent years the agency has been
criticized for applying these standards with an ideological bias.23 Ar-
guably, the USIA denied certification to each of the seven films in-
volved in Bullfrog because of the controversial nature of the views
they presented. 2 4 The films deal with such issues as uranium mining
in the United States, environmental effects of Agent Orange and
other tactics used in Vietnam, nuclear war, nuclear power, United
States-Nicaraguan relations, and problems facing American young
people including drugs, sex, and suicide. 2 5 The filmmakers alleged
that the government engaged in "selective censorship" by using
vague regulations to turn the Agreement into a "vehicle for social
and political propaganda" and certifying only films that were in
20 Bullfrog 1I, 847 F.2d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1988).
21 Comment, The Beirut Agreement: A License to Censor?, 7 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
255, 257 (1985). The court found it unlikely that other signatory nations were applying
any test as stringent. "So far as we can discern, with the exception of Canada, none of the
approximately sixty other Beirut Agreement participants ... has promulgated any formal
regulations to the treaty whatsoever." Bullfrog II, 847 F.2d at 507.
22 The regulations were initiated on July 14, 1967. 32 Fed. Reg. 10,352 (1967). At
the time of the litigation, §§ 502.6(a)(3) and (b)(5) were still in their original language.
Section 502.6(a)(3) was amended Oct. 19, 1968. 33 Fed. Reg. 15,547 (1968). Since this
suit commenced, the regulations have been amended three times. See infra notes 54-62
and accompanying text.
23 See Comment, Silenced Screens: The Role of the Un ited States Information Agency in Deny-
ing Export Certificates to American Films, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 77 (1984); Comment,
supra note 21.
The Agency's problems stem largely from Director Charles Z. Wick's vision of the
purpose of the Agency, which he described as "waging a war of ideas with our adversa-
ries." Heiman, Iproving the Quality of America's Voice, NATION's BusINESS, Apr. 1983, at 64.
After his appointment, the USIA became a center of controversy and embarrassment for
the Reagan Administration. Wick's Last Tapes, THE NATION, Dec. 29, 1984, at 704. During
Reagan's first term, there were many reports by the Press involving Charles Wick includ-
ing reports that he "had given jobs to the children of Cabinet members, had secretly tape-
recorded his telephone conversations, and ordered the USIA to maintain a blacklist of
liberals who would not be sent abroad under the Agency's auspices (among those banned,
Senator Gary Hart and Walter Cronkite)." Id. Wick also admitted that the Voice of
America had been used for covert action by former National Security Council aide Oliver
North. Weaver, II'hen the Voice of America Ignores Its Charter: An Insider Reports on a Pattern of
Abuses, COLUM.JOURNALISM REv., Nov. 1988, at 36.
24 Bullfrog 1, 646 F. Supp. 492, 496 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Bullfrog ll, 847 F.2d at 505. For
example, one of the plaintiffs' films is entitled In Our Own Backyards: Uranium Mining in the
United States, and "examines the impact of uranium mining on the environment and on
workers and nearby residents." 646 F. Supp. at 496; see supra notes 1-8 and accompanying
text. Another film, Secret Agent, was originally denied certification but was later granted it
through the Agency's appeal process. 646 F. Supp. at 496 n.5. Other films denied certifi-
cation were Peace: A Conscious Choice, I'hatever Happened to Childhood?, Save the Planet, Ecocide:
A Strategy of Wlar, and From the Ashes ...Nicaragua Today. For a more extensive list of
rejected films and the reasons given by the Agency for their rejection, see Comment, supra
note 23, at 106-11 n.199.
25 646 F. Supp. at 496; See also Comment, supra note 23, at 106-11 n.199.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
keeping with the views of the Reagan administration. 26
Three of the regulations set out by the USIA for determining
certification of materials under the Agreement were at issue in Bull-
frog.2 7 Section 502.6(a)(3) follows verbatim the definition of"educa-
tional, scientific, and cultural" found in the Agreement:
Audio visual materials shall be deemed to be of international
educational character:
When their primary purpose or effect is to instruct or inform
through the development of a subject or aspect of a subject, or when
their content is such as to maintain, increase or diffuse knowledge
and augment international understanding and good will;
When the materials are representative, authentic, and accurate;
and
When the technical quality is such that it does not interfere with
the use made of the material.
28
The second disputed section, 502.6(b)(3), sets out criteria by
which 502.6(a)(3) is to be interpreted:
The Agency does not certify or authenticate materials which by
special pleading attempt generally to influence opinion, conviction
or policy (religious, economic, or political propaganda), to espouse
a cause, or conversely, when they seem to attack a particular persua-
sion. Visual and auditory materials intended for use only in denomi-
national programs or other restricted organizational use in moral or
religious education and which otherwise meet the criteria set forth
under paragraph (a) of this section, may be determined eligible for
certification in the judgment of the Agency.2 9
Section 502.6(b)(5) also states interpretive criteria in similarly
restrictive language:
The Agency does not regard as augmenting international un-
derstanding or good will and cannot certify or authenticate any ma-
terial which may lend itself to misinterpretation, or
misrepresentation of the United States or other countries, their peo-
ples or institutions, or which appear to have as their purpose or ef-
fect to attack or discredit economic, religious, or political views or
practices.3
0
The dispute in Bullfrog centered on the meaning of "educa-
tional, scientific, and cultural" as required by the treaty and inter-
2 646 F. Supp. at 497.
27 Id. Those regulations were 22 C.F.R. §§ 502.6(a)(3), (b)(3), (b)(5) (1987).
Although not disputed in Bulifiog, other subsections of section 502.6 have also been criti-
cized as unconstitutional. Sections 502.6(b)(1) and (b)(2), which exclude from certifica-
tion any material "the primary purpose of which is to amuse or entertain," and material
"the primary purpose of which is to inform concerning timely current events." Sobel,
Rated PP (for "Political Propaganda ") by Uncle Sam's Movie Critics: Federal Regulations Concerniig
the Import and Export of Filois that May "Influence" Public Opinion. 5 ENTERTAINMENT L. REP. 3,
6 (1984); see also Comment, supra note 21, at 263.
28 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3) (1987). The last three paragraphs quote the Treaty, art. I,
verbatim.
29 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b)(3) (1987).
30 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b)(5) (1987).
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preted by the government. 31 The filmmakers claimed that the
USIA's application of section 502.6(a)(3), defining the kinds of
materials to benefit under the treaty, was unconstitutional. 32 They
also charged that some of the interpretive criteria found in sections
502.6(b)(3) and (b)(5) were facially invalid.33
The USIA defended the regulations, arguing that they did not
"punish or directly obstruct plaintiff's ability to produce or dissemi-
nate their films." '3 4 The agency also argued that the denial of bene-
fits under the treaty was similar to the Internal Revenue Service
disallowing a tax subsidy, and was therefore constitutional. 35 Fi-
nally, they argued that the government's need to control foreign per-
ceptions of the United States required a lower level of scrutiny under
the first amendment, 36 and that these foreign policy considerations
justified the use of content-based regulation of speech.37
The U.S. District Court entered summary judgment for the
plaintiffs on their first two claims, invalidating all three sections of
the regulations. 38 The court went beyond the scope of filmmakers'
claim and sua sponte reviewed the facial constitutionality of
502.6(a)(3), finding it deficient. 39 All three sections were held to be
unconstitutionally vague.40 The court stopped short of invalidating
the same language in the treaty itself, reasoning that "a constitution-
ally acceptable definition of 'educational' could fit comfortably
within the broad definition of the term set out in Article I of the
Treaty." 4'
The U.S. Court of Appeals. for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, fol-
lowing essentially the same rationale as the trial court. The court
found that the regulations impinged on the plaintiff's freedom of
speech by rejecting materials according to their content:42
The challenged regulations require that in order to be certified,
31 Bullfrog H, 847 F.2d at 502.
32 Bul0rog 1, 646 F. Supp. at 495-97.
33 Id.
34 Builfog II, 847 F.2d at 509.
35 Id. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540
(1983).
36 847 F.2d at 511.
37 Id. at 512.
8 Bullfrog 1, 646 F. Supp. at 510.
39 Id. at 507-08.
40 Id. at 504-07.
41 Id. at 508. Before conducting a Constitutional analysis, the court examined the
disputed regulations in light of the authorizing legislation. The filmmakers argued that
the USIA had unlawfully narrowed the scope of the Agreement definitions of "educa-
tional, scientific, and cultural." Id. Nevertheless, the court found that the Agreement lan-
guage was broad, and the statute equally so, such that the regulations were "not so
restrictive that we may find them inconsistent with [the enacting legislation's] broad man-
date." Id. Nor did the regulations conflict with the Treaty. "The fact that the Canadian
regulations are similar to those challenged here, and that UNESCO referred to them with-
out criticism, underscores our conclusion." Id. at 509.
42 Bul&rog H, 847 F.2d at 510.
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a film must be balanced and truthful; must neither criticize nor ad-
vocate any political, religious or economic views; and must not "by
special pleading" seek to influence opinion- or policy. Each of these
requirements draws content-based lines forbidden by the First
Amendment.
4 3
The court also found that the government infringed upon the
filmmakers' rights by "conditioning a valuable government benefit
on the basis of speech content."'4 4 Specifically, "the USIA forces
filmmakers to choose between exercising their right to free speech
and foregoing benefits under the Agreement, or curtailing their
speech and obtaining the benefits." 4 5
Finding that the filmmakers' rights were thus infringed, the
court examined the regulations under strict scrutiny review. In or-
der for the government to justify speech regulation under strict scru-
tiny it must have a compelling interest in doing so, and the
regulations must be narrowly drawn to achieve that end.4 6 The court
rejected the Government's argument that a deferential standard of
review was appropriate in the area of foreign relations. 4 7 Further-
more, the foreign policy considerations put forth by the Government
did not rise to the level of a compelling interest, and the regulations
were not narrowly drawn to effectuate such an interest.48
The Ninth Circuit also held the regulations unconstitutionally
vague.4 ) The court was unable to find clear meaning in the language
of section 502.5(b)(3), specifically such terms as "special pleading"
43 Id.
44 Id. at 511. In addition to the first amendment issue presented, this also involves
the Equal Protection doctrine, to the extent that differing viewpoints receive unequal
treatment.
45 Id.
46 "Level of scrutiny" is analogous to the degree of protection accorded to public
expression. Under strict scrutiny, the government has a heavy burden to justify the Con-
stitution's tolerance of restrictions on speech. Id. at 511. See Boos v. Barry, - U.S. -, 108
S.Ct. 1157, 1164 (1988); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
47 Id.
48 Bul rog II, at 512.
49 Id.
Laws that are vague are objectionable on a number of grounds. First,
they may "trap the innocent by not providing fair warning." ... Second, -[a]
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." . . Third, a vague stat-
ute that implicates First Amendment freedoms discourages the exercise of
those freedoms ....
Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (citations omitted)).
After the district court decision, the USIA drafted a new set of interim regulations to
replace § 502.6(a)(3). 52 Fed. Reg. 43,753 (1987). Four days before the Ninth Circuit
ruled on the USIA's appeal from this, the district court rejected the interim regulations as
unconstitutional. Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, No. CV 85-7930 AWT (C.D. Cal. May 13,
1988) [hereinafter Bullfrog I1]. The USIA, in turn, drafted still another set of regulations.
53 Fed. Reg. 45,079 (1988). These never took effect, as the Ninth Circuit stayed the dis-
trict court's order and temporarily reinstated the interim regulations, pending its decision
on the May 13, 1988 ruling. See 53 Fed. Reg. 47,674 (1988). For a discussion of the in-
terim regulations, see infra text accompanying notes 151-63.
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and "attempt generally to influence opinion. '' 50  Sections
502.6(b)(5) and 502.6(a)(3) were also deficient because they did not
define objective standards by which their criteria could be under-
stood.5' The filmmakers had no advance notice of what standards
their films had to meet in order to be considered "educational," and
the regulations would "enable USIA officials to act in an arbitrary
and discriminatory manner in granting or denying permits and still
be completely within the scope of their regulations."5 2 Like the trial
court, the court of appeals suggested that "educational, scientific,
and cultural" can be defined in ways sufficiently specific as to be con-
sistent with both the Constitution and the Beirut Agreement. 53 As a
result of the district court's 1986 ruling, the USIA replaced section
502.6(a)(3) with a lengthy and more detailed set of rules (hereinafter
1987 regulations). 54
In a new suit, Bullfrog III, the plaintiffs complained that the 1987
regulations "suffer[ed] from many of the same constitutional infirmi-
ties present in the original regulations." 5 5 The district court agreed,
finding that the "[1987] regulations continue to allow impermiss-
ible content-based discrimination ' 5( and "remain impermissibly
vague." 57 The district court enjoined the USIA from using the 1987
regulations, and ordered the agency to draft yet another set. 58
The USIA did draft a third set of regulations [hereinafter 1988
regulations], but at the same time appealed Bullfrog III to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 51) The Ninth Circuit accepted the appeal
and stayed the injunction of the 1987 regulations-thus temporarily
putting them back into effect.60 As this Note goes to press, the Ninth
Circuit has heard oral arguments but has not handed down an opin-
ion.6' Thus, the 1988 regulations have never taken effect, and the
1987 regulations are applicable to films currently under review for
certification. 62
III. Background
The first amendment environment from which Bullfrog emerges
5o Bullfrog 11, 847 F.2d at 513.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 514 (quoting amicus brief).
53 Id. Such definitions would still need to include content-based distinctions to some
degree. Id.
54 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3) (1988), as amended on Nov. 16, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 43,757
(1987). See infra note 153 for reproduction of text.
55 Bullfrog Ill, No. CV 85-7930 AWT, slip op. at 1-2 (C.D. Cal. filed May 13, 1988).
56 Id. at 2.
57 Id. at 3.
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has been developed in the Supreme Court over the past two decades.
The primary standard of analysis is whether or not a restriction on
speech is based on content. The law regarding content-based distinc-
tions and the first amendment right to free speech has traditionally
required such regulations to withstand strict scrutiny by fulfilling a
compelling governmment interest. So, while "the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content, ' '63 there
are times when the government, due to some compelling state inter-
est, can restrict speech. 64
Much of the current rule regarding content-based regulation of
speech arises from Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley. 65 Mosley was
a postal worker who regularly and peacefully picketed against the ra-
cial practices of a local high school. 66 Chicago adopted an ordinance
prohibiting picketing at schools, excepting labor disputes involving
the school. 67 Mosley sued the city to enjoin enforcement of the ordi-
nance so he could continue his protest.68 The Supreme Court struck
down the ordinance as unconstitutional because it discriminated
against speech based on content.69 "The essence of the forbidden
censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity
because of its content would completely undercut the profound na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 70
Mosley also developed a second criterion of first amendment
analysis, the public forum. 7 1 "[G]overnment may not grant the use
of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to
those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views. . . . Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be
based on content alone."'72 Public forum doctrine was set out in de-
tail by Justice White in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass 'n:
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have
been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit
expressive activity are sharply circumscribed. At one end of the
spectrum are streets and parks which "have immemorially been held
6" Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
64 Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 544-45
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
65 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
66 Id. at 93.
417 Id. at 92-94.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 102.
70 Id. at 96 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
71 Buchanan, Toward a Unified Theory of Goveruwniit Power to Regulate Protected Speech, 18
CONN. L. REV. 531, 535, 556-75 (1986). See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 96-97 (1972).
72 Mloslev, 408 U.S. at 96.
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in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions." In these quintessential
public forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative
activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state in-
terest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The State
may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of ex-
pression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.
7 3
Forum and content are closely interdependent variables. Assum-
ing that expression is in a traditional public forum, the state may not
regulate the content of expression without a compelling need to do
so. 74 Where the regulation is neutral as to content, seeking to con-
trol only the time, place, or manner of the speech, then the govern-
ment need only show a "significant" interest in the rule. 75 In either
case, the restrictions must be "tailored" so as to allow as much in
alternative means of expression as possible. 76
This analysis was applied recently in Boos v. Barry,77 in which a
Washington, D.C. law regulating the picketing of foreign embassies
was challenged by some people who wished to demonstrate at the
Nicaraguan and Russian embassies. The law prohibited picketing
that was intended to "bring into Public odium" the embassy, its em-
ployees, or the government represented. 78 The court found that be-
cause the prohibited activity was within the traditional public forum
of the streets and sidewalks, it impinged on the first amendment's
protection. 791 The justices disagreed, however, on whether the pro-
hibition drew content-based distinctions.8" Arguably it was content-
73 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citations omitted). The government can also create a fo-
rum for expression that is subject to the same protections. Id. at 46. By entering into the
Beirut Agreement, the Government has created a forum in the sense of a channel for
information. See id. at 45. Fora either exist "by long tradition" or are created "by govern-
ment fiat." Id. "Once a forum is opened up ... to some groups, government may not
prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say."
Aloslev, 408 U.S. at 96. However, the public forum issue was not raised in Bullfrog.
14 Pen, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Buchanan, supra note 71, at 564. For example, the
Chicago ordinance tried to regulate Mr. Mosley's picket sign on the basis of content, be-
cause it distinguished between labor picketing and other subjects. Mlosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
"The central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in
terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picketing on the subject of a school's labor-manage-
ment dispute is permitted, but all other peaceful picketing is prohibited." Id.
75 Pe n, 460 U.S. at 45.
76 Id. "The Court, albeit in dicta, has clearly determined that no matter how compel-
ling the state interest, the Constitution does not permit government to ban all expressive
activity from the traditional public forum." Buchanan, supra note 71, at 564. Citizens have
an absolute right to expression in some forum. Id.
77 __ U.S. -- , 108 S.Ct. 1157 (1987).
78 Id. at 1161.
7" Id. at 1162.
8o See id. at 1162-63, 1171-73 (Brennan, J., concurring), 1173 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
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neutral, since "the government is not itself selecting between view-
points."'8 1 Justice O'Connor compromised, somewhat, by saying
that the regulation was viewpoint-neutral, but not content-neutral. 82
In Boos, the government argued that its duties under interna-
tional law, enforced by the anti-picketing law, constituted a compel-
ling government interest which justified the use of content-based
regulation.8 3 The government relied upon three Supreme Court de-
cisions which emphasize the executive's control over matters involv-
ing foreign policy. 84 The first of these cases is Zemel v. Rusk, 8 5 where
the State Department refused to validate appellant's passport for
travel into Cuba, and the appellant argued that this violated his right
to liberty, which includes the freedom to travel.8 6 The Supreme
Court noted, "[t]he Secretary has justifiably concluded that travel to
Cuba by American citizens might involve the Nation in dangerous
international incidents, and that the Constitution does not require
him to validate passports for such travel."8' 7 The Court went on to
say, "[t]hat the restriction which is challenged in this case is sup-
ported by the weightiest considerations of national security is per-
haps best pointed up by recalling that the Cuban missile crisis of
October 1962 preceded the filing of appellant's complaint by less
than two months." 88
Regan v. Wald"!' was a 1984 case also involving restrictions on
travel-related transactions with Cuba. There, the Court held,
"[m]atters related to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so ex-
clusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference. '" 90
81 Id. at 1162-63.
82 Id. at 1163.
[Wle agree the provision is not viewpoint-based. The display clause de-
termines which viewpoint is acceptable in a neutral fashion by looking to the
policies of foreign governments. While this prevents the display clause from
being directly viewpoint-based, a label with potential First Amendment
ramifications of its own . . . it does not render the statute content-neutral.
Rather, we have held that a regulation that "does not favor either side of a
political controversy" is nonetheless impermissable because the "First
Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends . . . to prohibi-
tion of public discussion of an entire topic." . . . Here, the government has
determined that an entire category of speech-signs or displays critical of
foreign governments-is not to be permitted.
Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530
(1980)).
83 Id. at 1163.
84 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I (1964); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Regan v.
Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
85 381 U.S. 1 (1964).
86 Id. at 4.
87 Id. at 15.
88 Id. at 16.
8 ) 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
90 Id. at 242 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)).
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Finally, in Haig v. Agee, 9 1 the Secretary of State revoked a former
CIA employee's passport when it became apparent that the former
agent was engaged in a campaign to expose CIA operations and
agents in foreign countries. 92 There the Court recognized that the
revocation was based at least in part on the content of Agee's speech,
especially his repeated disclosures of confidential information. 93
The Court emphasized that in cases such as this, speech that jeopar-
dizes U.S. intelligence personnel is certainly not protected by the
first amendment and that the government had to take whatever steps
were within its power to ensure national security and the ability to
conduct foreign relations. 94
In Boos, however, the Court found that while "the United States
has a vital national interest in complying with international law," '9 5
the fact that it is recognized in international law does not automati-
cally render that interest "compelling" for the purposes of first
amendment analysis. 96 This created a significant inroad into the
principle that foreign policy questions rest solely in the executive
branch and are generally non-justiciable.
In Meese v. Keene, another case dealing with the first amendment
and international policy, the Supreme Court upheld regulatory lan-
guage authorizing the Attorney General to require certain disclo-
sures be attached to media materials imported into the United States
which fit the statutory definition of "political propaganda. '9 7 In
Keene, the Attorney General's Office designated three films which
were imported from Canada9 8 as propaganda pursuant to the For-
eign Agents Registration Act (hereinafter FARA).1'1 The plaintiff, an
American politician who intended to exhibit the films, argued that
this infringed on his free speech rights by attaching an official gov-
91 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
92 Id. at 283-86.
93 Id. at 308.
94 id. at 308-09.
95 108 S.Ct. at 1164.
96 Id. at 1165. This suggested to the Ninth Circuit in Bul/og I1 that the Beirut Agree-
ment was not automatically a compelling reason for the government to regulate the films
as it did. 847 F.2d at 512.
97 481 U.S. 465, 485 (1987).
98 The films are entitled If 1ou Love This Planet, Acid Rain: Requiem or Recoveu,, and Acid
Fromn Heaven. Id. at 468 n.3.
99 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Keene, 481 U.S. at 468. The FARA
itself required only that registered foreign agents bringing films or literature into the
country register that material with the U.S. Attorney General, and mark it conspicuously
"setting forth the relationship or connection between the person transmitting the political
propaganda . . . and such propaganda." 22 U.S.C. § 614(b) (1982). The requirement that
the materials be labelled as "political propaganda" is an administrative regulation under
this section, which authorizes the Attorney General to "require the inclusion of such other
information contained in the registration statement identifying such agent of a foreign
principal and such political propaganda and its sources as may be appropriate." Keene, 108
U.S. at 468.
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ernment censure to his actions in exhibiting the films. 0 0 The Court
held that the term "political propaganda" did not mean "a form of
slanted, misleading speech that does not merit serious attention,"
but primarily had a "broad neutral definition," and therefore did not
affect the plaintiff's freedom of speech.' 0 ' The Court also stated
that the statute had a legitimate purpose, to "better enable the pub-
lic to evaluate the import of the propaganda."'' 0 2
Another first amendment issue germane to Bullfrog is whether a
content-based tax or tax exemption is an impermissible selection by
the government.' 0 3 With regard to this, the Supreme Court said:
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable govern-
ment benefit and even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected inter-
ests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.
1 4
While the government may not prevent a person from exercis-
ing a constitutional right, the government is not required to actively
assist (or subsidize) a person in exercising a constitutional right., 05
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation, °0 1 the Court stated "although
government may not place obstacles in the path of a [person's] exer-
cise of ... freedom of [speech], it need not remove those not of it's
own creation."' 1 0 7 This was the deciding principle in Maher v. Roe l')
and Harris v. McRae.'0 9 In both cases the Court held that the govern-
ment was under no obligation to help indigent women facilitate their
right to have an abortion by paying for abortions, even though the
government pays for other health care services for individuals in the
same economic state, so long as the government does not create ob-
stacles not already present. I 10
In Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States of America,''' the Internal
Revenue Service denied nonprofit organization status (and thereby a
tax exemption) to a feminist publication.' 12 The Service based its
100 Id. at 473.
101 Id. at 471. The statute itself defines propaganda as communication which is in-
tended either to persuade or influence the recipient with regard to a political or public
interest matter (the broad, neutral definition), or to promote violence or social conflict
(the perjorative meaning). Id. at 471-72; 22 U.S.C. § 611 (j). But see Keene, 481 U.S. at 486-
90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102 Keene, 481 U.S. at 480.
10 847 F.2d at 509.
104 Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
105 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549-50
(1983).
it Id. at 540.
107 Id. at 549-50 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)).
108 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977).
109 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
1 10 Id.; Maher, 432 U.S. at 473.
M 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
112 Id. at 1033.
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decision on finding that the magazine was commercial, political, and
advocated lesbianism.' 13 The court held that the Service's definition
of "educational," the status under which the magazine sought its tax
exemption, was unconstitutionally vague.' 14 "Thus, although First
Amendment activities need not be subsidized by the state, the dis-
criminatory denial of tax exemptions can impermissibly infringe free
speech. Similarly, regulations authorizing tax exemptions may not
be so unclear as to afford subjective application by IRS officials."' 115
This rule was strengthened recently in Arkansas Writers' Project,
Inc. v. Ragland.'1 6 The Supreme Court held that an Arkansas sales
tax on magazines, which exempted newspapers and religious, profes-
sional, trade, and sports journals, violated the first amendment by
discriminating against certain kinds of publications.' 17 The Court
found that the tax employed content-based distinctions that were not
narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.' 18
Justice Scalia, representing the other side in a long-standing
constitutional debate, dissented in Arkansas Writers' Project.'' 9 He
noted that a tax exemption was tantamount to a government subsidy,
and that the government permissibly subsidizes institutions on the
basis of content all the time. 120 He argued that "[t]he reason that
denial of participation in a tax exemption or other subsidy scheme
does not necessarily 'infringe' a fundamental right is that-unlike di-
rect restriction or prohibition-such a denial does not, as a general
rule, have any significant coercive effect."'21 Justice Scalia suggested
that a tax that was selective as to viewpoint (as opposed to content),
should more appropriately be subjected to the highest scrutiny.122
IV. Significance of the Case
In Bullfrog, unconstitutional USIA regulations enabled that
agency to discriminate against films containing views adverse to the
''3 Id.
114 Id. at 1035-39. The disputed regulation said, in part, "an organization may be
educational even though it advocates a particular position or viewpoint so long as it
presents a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individ-
ual or the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion." Id. at 1034-35.
115 Id. at 1034 (citations omitted).
116 -- U.S.--, 107 S.Ct. 1722 (1987).
117 Id. at 1729. See also, Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591-92 (1983).
118 107 S.Ct. at 1729. The Court reiterated the importance of not allowing content-
based discrimination with regard to speech. Id. at 1731-32.
' ',) Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 1730-32. Scalia offered the Kennedy Center and special postal rates for non-
profit organizations as examples of federal subsidies based on specific speech content.
121 Id. at 173 1. But see, Sobel, First Amendment Standards for Government Subsidies of Artistic
and Cultural Expression: A Reply to Justices Scalia and Rehnquist, 41 VAND. L. REV. 517 (1988).
122 107 S.Ct. at 1731. See Sobel, supra note 121, at 524. Professor Sobel argues that
"content neutrality" includes "viewpoint neutrality," and "subject matter neutrality," and
that the growing distinction between content and viewpoint is not necessary. Id.
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Reagan administration.123 Although the Ninth Circuit followed well-
established Supreme Court precedent in finding the regulations dis-
criminatory on the basis of content, and it appears unlikely that Bull-
frog will be overturned, three issues appear to be vulnerable to attack
on appeal.
A. Vulnerable Issues
1. Distinction Between Manner of Denial and Denial Itself
One issue is the distinction between the manner of denying a
benefit and the denial of the benefit itself. The USIA argued that in
denying certification to the films in question, the government was
merely refusing to aid the filmmakers in exercising their first amend-
ment rights. 124 Thus, the filmmakers were not barred from exporting
their films; they were simply required to pay import duties and meet
other restrictions imposed by the importing country.125
The court of appeals rejected this argument and asserted in-
stead that the denial of certification is "an absolute barrier to the
benefits under the [Agreement]."126 While it is not stated directly in
the opinion, it can be inferred from this assertion that the denial of
certification bars the film from receiving any assistance under the
Agreement and is, therefore, an obstacle to free speech created by
the government. This "absolute barrier" assertion is a distinguish-
ing factor between Bullfrog and the Regan, Harris, and Maher line of
cases advanced by the government as controlling.' 2 7 In each of
those cases the holding relied on the proposition that the denial of
benefits had placed no barrier in the path of the exercising of one's
rights. 128
The contention that denial of certification is a government-
placed obstacle-in the sense anticipated in Regan-is appealing be-
cause it addresses the government's argument that the denial of cer-
tification does not interfere with the right to free speech; filmmakers
can still disseminate their work to the world community.' 2 9 How-
ever, on a practical level, the films that are denied certification are
competing on the global market with films which have been granted
certification. Since the uncertified films' cost to consumers in for-
eign countries will no doubt be inflated by the customs duties and
licensing fees imposed on them, the films will not be as viable for
successful exportation. An independent filmmaker may find it im-




127 See supra text accompanying notes 105-10.
128 Much like the indigent women in Maher and Hanis could still have abortions, only
not at government expense. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
129 Comment, supra nole 23, at 102-03; Sobel, supra note 27, at 9.
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possible to distribute the film on an international scale, all due to the
"obstacle" of denied certification.13 0 The fact that the court adopted
this practical approach is apparent in the "absolute barrier" designa-
tion, and a previous comment by the court rejecting the govern-
ment's "benign characterization of the effect of their regulations."' 3 '
The "absolute barrier" distinction seems strained as applied
here. Technically, the government was correct in its argument that
the denial of certification is not a barrier to free speech. Filmmakers
are still free to distribute their films regardless of their certification
status. It is puzzling that the court was compelled to make the dis-
tinction at all. Even if the court had failed to distinguish Bullfrog
from these cases on a factual basis, it seems certain that the outcome
would have been the same. Regan, Maher, and Harris all deal with the
question of whether or not the denial of a specific government bene-
fit in and of itself constitutes a violation of constitutional rights and
do not address the manner in which the benefit was denied. 13 2
While the difference between the manner of denial and the de-
nial itself may seem insignificant in the abstract, it is an important
concept regarding this area of constitutional law and was the essence
of Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Regan.' 3 3 If the manner
of denying treaty benefits to the Bullfrog films was unconstitutional, it
is immaterial to the ultimate outcome of the case whether or not the
denial of this specific benefit was unconstitutional in and of itself.' 34
Perhaps the court chose to make the distinction as a way of strength-
ening the argument for its holding, or perhaps the court wanted to
make a strong statement regarding the selective allocation of govern-
ment benefits as an indirect way of curtailing free speech.' 3 5
2. The "Delicate Area" of Foreign Relations
Another issue that might be subject to debate on appeal is that
the executive branch should be held to a lower level of scrutiny "be-
130 Bul rog 11, 847 F.2d at 509.
131 Sobel, supra note 27, at 9.
132 847 F.2d at 511.
133 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 551-54
(1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring). "I write separately to make clear that in my view the
result under the First Amendment depends entirely upon the Court's necessary assump-
tion-which I share-about the manner in which the Internal Revenue Service administers
§ 501." Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
134 See Comment, supra note 21, at 266 n.88.
135 The second possible explanation is consistent with Supreme Court decisions which
have often looked upon indirect curtailments of free speech with as much disfavor as direct
means of first amendment infringment. "For if the government could deny a benefit to a
person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the govern-
ment to 'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.' Such interference with
constitutional rights is impermissible." Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)
(quoting Speiser v. Randal, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
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cause USIA certification decisions implicate 'the delicate area of for-
eign relations.' "136 The government relied on Zemel, Agee, and
Wald 137 to argue that foreign relations constitute an overriding in-
terest.' 38 All of these cases seem to support the argument that con-
trol of foreign policy is a compelling state interest, justifying the
government's discretion in certification of films.' 39 However, these
cases were not found to be controlling in Bullfrog.140 The court of
appeals instead looked to the very recent Supreme Court decision in
Boos v. Barry to determine that there was no compelling state interest,
and furthermore, the regulations were not narrowly drawn to accom-
modate such an interest if it did exist. 14 1
In light of Boos, it is easy to comprehend the Ninth Circuit's rea-
sons for holding that the USIA regulations disputed in Bullfrog were
not justified by the Government's foreign policy concerns. 142 The
restrictions in Boos, which prohibited the display of placards critical
of a foreign government within five hundred feet of that govern-
ment's embassy, are much more narrowly drawn than the USIA regu-
lations in dispute here. 143
3. Content versus Viewpoint
The final vulnerable issue is the debate as to whether state regu-
lation of speech content or speech viewpoint is the appropriate sub-
ject of strict scrutiny under the first amendment. In Bullfrog H the
Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme Court majority, holding, "[e]ven
if the regulations could be deemed neutral with respect to their bur-
den on viewpoint, 144 they may still 'interfere' with the exercise of
plaintiffs' free speech interests if they improperly discriminate be-
tween exercises of protected speech on the basis of content."' 45
The opposing view, advanced by the USIA and advocated by
139! 847 F.2d at 511. The government argued that the means of regulation need only
show a "rational relation" to the end sought. Id.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 84-94.
1:8 Bul&frog I1, 847 F.2d at 511.




143 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
144 Even so, the court questioned the viewpoint neutrality of the regulations in a foot-
note to the opinion:
[Trhe regulations forbid certification of films that "present a point of
view." In Our Own Backyards, for example, was denied certification not be-
cause of its general subject-matter-nuclear energy-but because it ex-
pressed a "point of view" on that subject. However, Radiation... Naturally, a
film on the same subject with the opposite point of view, was granted an
educational certificate. Arguably, In Our Own BackYards was denied certifica-
tion because its viewpoint was one with which USIA and Department of En-
ergy officials did not agree.
847 F.2d at 509-10 n. 11.
145 Id. at 510.
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Justice Scalia, would strictly scrutinize regulation of speech only if it
pertained to viewpoint. The court also rejected the USIA's argu-
ment that the regulations "do not punish or directly obstruct" plain-
tiff's freedom of speech, and that "this is a case of the government
simply declining to pay a subsidy .... ,"146 The Agency relied on
Regan, in which the IRS denied a tax exemption to a lobbying organi-
zation. 4 7 The Supreme Court there held that this decision "re-
flected Congress' choice under the spending power to refuse to use
Treasury funds to subsidize the lobbying activity."' 4 8 The Agency's
argument also echoed Justice Scalia's dissent in Arkansas Writers' Pro-
ject v. Ragland 14 that a tax exemption was like a subsidy which Con-
gress properly granted within its discretion over the nation's purse
strings. 150
B. The Revised Regulations
Besides fighting the Bullfrog decisions in court, the USIA has
been less than cooperative in rewriting the offending regulations.
The set of regulations promulgated by the USIA in response to Bull-
frog H appears unlikely to survive constitutional scrutiny by the Ninth
Circuit. 151
146 Id. at 509. It can also be argued that certification is a subsidy, since the govern-
ment loses no income and incurs no cost from certifying films.
147 Id.; Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 542
(1983).
148 Bullfrog 11, 847 F.2d at 509 (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 548).
14) 41 U.S. 221, 235 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150 Id.
151 The set of regulations provide:
Audio visual materials which are deemed "educational, scientific or cul-
tural" for the purposes of Article I of the Beirut Agreement of 1948 are those
"whose primary purpose or effect is to instruct or inform through the devel-
opment of a subject or aspect of a subject, or when their content is such as to
maintain, increase or diffuse knowledge, and augment international under-
standing and goodwill," as defined below as comprising the following ele-
ments:(i) The content of the audio visual material is presented in a primarily
factual or demonstrative manner.
(ii) To the extent that the material reflects a viewpoint or viewpoints
which purport to be supported by factual bases, the facts are not distorted.
The facts will be deemed distorted if they do not represent the current state
of factual knowledge of a subject or aspect of a subject, verifiable by gener-
ally accepted methods, or if the facts are presented in such a way as to consti-
tute hate material (such as the racial supremacist material involved in National
Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (1983)).
(iii) To the extent that the material presents, promotes, or advocates a
conclusion or viewpoint for which different viewpoint(s), theory(ies) or inter-
pretation(s) may exist, the material ackn6wledges, presents or refers to the
existence of a difference of opinion or other point of view.(iv) The technical quality is such that it does not interfere with the use
made of the material.
In the "Summary of Content" section of the certificate, the Agency, in its
discretion, may identify material that in its opinion constitutes propaganda,
in that it is substantially adapted to prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, in-
duce or in any other way influence a viewer or user with reference to any
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For instance, subparagragh (iii) requires that where the material
"presents, promotes, or advocates a conclusion or viewpoint for
which different viewpoint(s), theory(ies) or interpretation(s) may ex-
ist, the material acknowledges, presents or refers to the existence of
a difference of opinion or other point of view."1 52 This appears to
exert some content-neutral prior control over expression by the gov-
ernment. Perhaps the government has an interest in forcing a bal-
anced presentation,' 53 or this may simply be a means of requiring
that the viewer/listener be informed that a viewpoint is being ad-
vanced. This requirement would not inhibit expression on a particu-
lar point of view, or even alter the content of the discourse. Yet it is
suspect merely for requiring that some mention be made of oppos-
ing views. The district court found that this raised practical
problems of enforcement and, more important, intruded "on the ed-
itorial license of the filmmaker by requiring him or her to include
views inimical to his or her own position."1 54
Finally, the USIA reserves the right to label certified material
that "in its opinion constitutes propaganda, in that it is substantially
adapted to prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce or in any
other way influence a viewer . '. ."155 This language apparently took
impetus from Meese v. Keene.' 56 Evidently the USIA took this as a
blanket authorization for the government to label films being ex-
ported in the same way.
However, exporting films to other countries under the Beirut
Agreement is an entirely different situation than in Keene. To begin
with, although it may be inferred from Keene that foreigners have less
freedom than U.S. citizens to communicate with U.S. audiences, it
can hardly be assumed from this that U.S. citizens have less than full
freedom of speech when communicating with other countries. Fur-
thermore, the registration of imported films was intended to protect
the U.S. public from misleading information. 15 7 The disclosure
statement attached to the films in Keene never included the word
"political propaganda." Unlike Keene, in this case neither the Beirut
specific political, religious or economic views, practices, movements, causes
or systems or [sic] belief. Where an applicant identifies an intended audience
the Agency may also express an opinion in the "Summary of Content" sec-
tion of the certificate as to whether that audience possesses the background
or training to understand the subject matter.
22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3) (1988), as amended on Nov. 16, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 43,757 (1987).
The language in §§ 502.6(b)(3) and (b)(5) was simply deleted. 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b)
(1988).
152 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(iii) (1988).
153 "The danger inherent in government editorial oversight, even in the interest of
'balance,' is well established." Bullfrog II, 847 F.2d 502, 510 (9th Cir. 1988).
154 Bullfrog Ill, No. CV 85-7930 AWT, slip op. at 5 (CD. Cal. filed May 13, 1988).
155 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
156 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
157 Keene, 481 U.S. at 481.
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Agreement nor the enacting statute contemplates a government la-
belling material as to the effect or intended effect of their contents.
Nor has it been advanced that the government has a legitimate inter-
est in protecting foreign audiences.
Also, the labelling scheme in Keene was aimed at the audience
receiving the information.' 58 Here, the USIA seeks to warn the offi-
cials of the foreign goverment that the material is "political propa-
ganda."' 59 Such a label could easily be construed by the importing
government as a condemnation of the materials or even as a signal
that certification should be denied on their end. As the court in Bull-
frog noted, "USIA certificates are accepted by importing states as a
matter of course."' 60 In the order striking down these interim regu-
lations, the district court said, "the only conceivable purpose for la-
belling films propaganda would be to discourage foreign countries
from granting the usual financial benefits accruing to recipients of
Beirut certificates." 161
Even in light of Keene, this provision is potentially unconstitu-
tional for vagueness, for it leaves the USIA the discretion to deter-
mine what propaganda is and define the distinction between
"indoctrination" and "instruction." One person's freedom fighter is
another's pirate or mercenary, yet the USIA reserves the right to at-
tach its own opinion regarding these distinctions to the speech of
U.S. citizens.
The USIA also reserves the right to inform the importing gov-
ernment of its opinion as to whether the intended audience "pos-
sesses the background or training to understand the subject
matter."' 162 This is an appellation which is based on the Agency's
discretion, based on content, and potentially affects the disposition
of the materials. Thus the regulation is lacking the compelling justifi-
cation that strict scrutiny review requires.
Ironically, the USIA's third set of regulations, which were stayed
by the Ninth Circuit pending appeal, seem to hold the most promise
for achieving the aims of the Beirut Agreement.' 63 This set of rules
158 Id. at 470 & n.6.
15,) 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3) (1988).
'"o Bullfrog II, 847 F.2d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1988). The court points out that most
other nations do not have uniform standards by which they qualify materials for treaty
benefits, and therefore accept the USIA's certification without question. Id.
161 Bullfrog 111, No. CV 85-7930 AWT, slip op. at 5 (C.D. Cal. filed May 13, 1988).
162 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3) (1988).
163 53 Fed. Reg. 45,080 (1988) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3)), (currently
under injunction), quoted in full:
(3) Audio visual materials which are deemed "educational, scientific or
cultural" for the purposes of Article I of the Beirut Agreement of 1948 are
those whose "primary purpose or effect is to instruct or inform through the
development of a subject or aspect of a subject, or when their content is such
as to maintain, increase or diffuse knowledge, and augment international un-
derstanding and goodwill; when the materials are representative, authentic,
1989]
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appears to comply with the constitutional requirements as defined in
Bullfrog, by removing content-based standards, broadly and clearly
defining "educational," setting out clear examples of how the rules
will be applied, and dropping the matter of "political propaganda"
altogether. However, these regulations are not in use as the injunc-
tion of the 1987 regulations is under stay. Therefore the USIA pres-
ently examines and certifies films for benefits under the Beirut
Agreement according to the 1987 regulations.
C. Alternative Solutions
One commentator has suggested that the USIA is not the proper
agency for carrying out the objectives of the Beirut Agreement be-
cause the agency's goal of providing a "correct" depiction of the
United States is inconsistent with the goals set out in the treaty. 164
To avoid this conflict of purpose, an agency with goals related to
culture or education rather than politics could be assigned the task of
certifying films under the Beirut Agreement.
Another suggestion would have the USIA look only to the
money-making potential of a film, since most educational films do
not come close to the profit potential of "the money-making block-
buster motion pictures the Beirut agreement was intended to ex-
clude."' 165 Another suggestion was to have the film defined as edu-
cational or cultural depending on the identity of the purchaser.' 6 6
and accurate; and when the technical quality is such that it does not interfere
with the use made of the material." This means that:
(i) The subject matter of the materials must teach or explain through a
reasoned development of a subject or aspect of a subject to aid the viewer or
listener in a learning process. The educational character of the materials
may be evidenced by a teacher's guide, study guide or similar collateral in-
structional materials prepared by a bona fide subject matter specialist.
(ii) Materials which present viewpoints, positions, facts or information
so selectively as to constitute an incitement of hatred or violence against a
government, group or person, or which make use of inflammatory or dispar-
aging terms or express conclusions more on the basis of strong emotional
feelings than objective evaluations, will not be deemed educational. For ex-
ample, facts or information presented in such a way as to constitute hate
material (such as the racial supremacist material involved in National Alliance
v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (1983)), does not qualify for certification.
(iii) The technical quality of the materials must be such that it does not
interfere with the use of the materials. For example, sound tracks must be
clear and distinct, and photography must by sharp and easy to watch.
Id.
164 In fact, the USIA has so actively pursued its objective of providing a "correct"
picture of the United States that it has been called the "propaganda arm" of the United
States Government. Bollinger & Mudd, M1ixing Polls and Propaganda, THE NATION, May 7,
1988, at 635.
165 Comment, snpra note 21, at 277. The commentator notes that this solution is not
foolproof because a very popular educational or cultural film may go beyond the monetary
limit. She suggests that even so, such a solution only deprives a small portion of otherwise
qualified films of the benefits under the Agreement, and is more beneficial to the "free
flow of ideas" than content-based regulations. Id.
16 Comment, snpra note 23, at 104.
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For example, films purchased by foreign educational institutions and
museums would qualify under such a criterion.' 6 7 The administra-
tive ease embodied in both suggested methods of certification is en-
ticing. Both methods would alleviate discriminatiory practices
regarding the content of films, and filmmakers would know in ad-
vance whether or not their films qualify for benefits under the
treaty. 168
It appears that the Bullfrog courts rejected solutions such as
these that would completely do away with the content-based nature
of the certification decision.' 69 In the last paragraph of its opinion
the Ninth Circuit "recognize[d] that the implementation of the Bei-
rut Agreement requires some content-based judgments."' 70 How-
ever, remedies such as those suggested above by commentators are
possible. It is simply beyond the scope of the judiciary to transfer
power from one agency to another or to decree that the regulations
should be based on purely economic criteria. These are actions that
rest appropriately with the legislative branch of the government. Per-
haps, considering the effect the Bullfrog decisions will have on the
plaintiffs and other filmmakers in future attempts to obtain certifica-
tion under the Beirut Agreement, the time is ripe for such changes.
V. Conclusion
Bullfrog represents the continued protection of the first amend-
ment's guarantee of freedom of speech. Where, under the Beirut
Agreement, the United States created a channel for communication
with the peoples of other countries, the government may not selec-
tively limit such communication on the basis of the content of the
viewpoint presented.
However, the USIA has sought to evade this rule and continues
to impose its own views upon this channel of communication.
Although the regulations, as altered, conform to the first amendment
with regard to certifying audio visual material, section 502.6(a)(3) al-
lows the USIA to effectively hamper distribution of material of which
it disapproves by labeling it as propaganda or as beyond the under-
standing of the intended audience. This could lead to drastic effects
on the certification process at the importing country. There is no
justification sufficiently compelling to allow the USIA to make such
determinations. It is evident that continued judicial scrutiny, and
167 Id.
168 Id. This would alleviate the problems associated with content-based regulations
and vague language within the regulations. Id.
1(;1 See Comment, supra note 21, at 277; Comment, supra note 23, at 103-05. These
articles were published in 1985 and 1984, respectively, prior to Bulifrog I. One can safely
assume that the Bulfog I court was aware of these argtiments, since it cited Comment,
supra note 21, in the opinion. 847 F.2d at 509.
170 847 F.2d at 514.
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perhaps legislative action, is necessary to protect the expressions of
Americans in the worldwide marketplace of ideas.
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